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Abstract. Certificate-based public key cryptography not only solves certificate re-
vocation problem in traditional PKI but also overcomes key escrow problem inher-
ent in identity-based cryptosystems. This new primitive has become an attractive
cryptographic paradigm. In this paper, we propose the notion and the security
model of certificate-based designated verifier signatures (CBDVS). We provide the
first construction of CBDVS and prove that our scheme is existentially unforgeable
against adaptive chosen message attacks in the random oracle model. Our scheme
only needs two pairing operations, and the signature is only one element in the bi-
linear group G1. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme enjoys shortest signature
length with less operation cost.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In traditional digital signatures, a signer with a secret key signs a message and any-
one with access to the corresponding public key can verify the validity of the mes-
sage. A signature verifier can convince any third party about this fact by presenting
a digital signature on a message. Sometimes we do not want to present publicly ver-
ifiable signatures to other parties, such as certificates for hospital records, income
summary, etc. in the real world. We only wish the designated verifier to verify
the authentication of the message. In order to solve the above problem, Jackobs-
son, Sako and Impagliazzo [1] proposed the concept of designated verifier signatures
(DVS). In a DVS scheme, the signer can designate a single party, i.e. the designated
verifier, and only this designated verifier can be convinced about the validity of the
signatures. DVS can be viewed as a tradeoff between ordinary signatures (where sig-
natures are publicly verifiable) and undeniable signatures (where the signer has the
full control of signatures). Lipmaa et al. [2] showed that the signer could abuse the
disavowal protocol in [1]. In addition, they gave a rigorous formalization of the secu-
rity for designated-verifier signature schemes, and proposed an efficient designated-
verifier signature scheme that was provably unforgeable under a tight reduction
to the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem in the random oracle model. Kudla and
Paterson [3] showed that non-interactive designated verifier (NIDV) proofs in [1]
may have applications outside of the context of undeniable signatures and presented
two security models, one for general NIDV proof systems, and the other for NIDV
undeniable signatures. They also presented the full domain hash variant of the un-
deniable signature scheme of Chaum [4] with NIDV confirmation and denial proofs.
In order to improve the privacy of users in certification systems, Steinfeld et al. [5]
introduced a special type of digital signature scheme called a universal designated-
verifier signature (UDVS) scheme. They defined precise security notions for UDVS
schemes, proposed an efficient deterministic UDVS scheme based on bilinear pairs,
and proved that their scheme was secure in the random oracle model under the
hardness of the bilinear Diffie Hellman problem. Furthermore, Steinfeld et al. [6]
showed how to efficiently extend the standard Schnorr and RSA signature schemes
into UDVS schemes.
DVS was originally introduced under traditional public key cryptosystem (PKC),
where the public key of the user is a random string. The central problem in tradi-
tional PKC is to prove that a public key is genuine and authentic, and has not been
tampered by malicious users. The usual approach is to use a certificate to bind the
identity of an entity, its public key and other information. Certificates are gener-
ated by a trusted certificate authority (CA), which can be viewed as CA’s signature.
However, traditional PKC is generally considered to be costly to use and manage.
The first construction of identity-based DVS scheme was proposed in [7], whose
purpose is to solve the above mentioned problem in traditional PKC. Kang et al. [8]
presented a novel identity-based strong designated verifier signature scheme, which
has short size of signature, low communication and computational cost. However,
in identity-based public key cryptosystem (ID-PKC), the trusted authority, known
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as the private key generator (PKG), can generate private keys of all users, and thus
private key escrow becomes an inherent problem in ID-PKC. Moreover, private key
must be sent over secure channel, which makes private key distribution difficult.
Certificateless public key cryptosystem (CL-PKC) [9, 10] was proposed to combine
the merits of traditional PKC and ID-PKC. Huang et al. [11] proposed the first
notion and construction of DVS in CL-PKC. In 2008, Chen et al. [12] also proposed
an efficient certificateless short designated verifier signature scheme. Recently, Yang
et al. [13] formalized the notion and the security model for certificateless strong desig-
nated verifier signature scheme (CLSDVS) and then presented an efficient CLSDVS
scheme. However, CL-PKC also needs a secure channel to transmit partial private
keys. In order to solve the above problem, Gentry et al. [14] introduced a new
paradigm called certificate-based public key cryptography (CB-PKC) in Eurocrypt
2003. Like traditional PKC, CB-PKC also has a third party (called CA) to generate
certificates. But the difference is that the certificate is also necessary for decryption
in CB-PKC. A correct decryption needs both the private key and an up-to-date
certificate from the CA. Therefore, it overcomes the drawbacks in traditional PKC
and ID-PKC. On the other hand, there is no need to keep certificate secret since
certificate is used to prove the authenticity and uniqueness of the public key.
In CT-RSA ’04, Kang and Park [15] proposed the first certificate-based signa-
ture (CBS) scheme, and proved that the scheme was secure in the random oracle
model. Li et al. [16] first introduced key replacement attack into CBS and refined
the security model of CBS. They showed that one of the CBS schemes in [15] was
insecure under the key replacement attack. Furthermore, they constructed a new
certificate-based signature scheme, which was existentially unforgeable against adap-
tive chosen message attacks under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in
the random oracle model. Compared with the other secure CBS scheme, this scheme
enjoys shorter signature length and less operation cost. Au et al. [17] proposed
a new notion called certificate-based ring signature, together with a formal security
model and a concrete implementation. In 2008, Liu et al. [18] proposed two new
certificate-based signature schemes with new features and advantages. The first one
was very efficient as it does not require any pairing computation and its security can
be proven under discrete logarithm assumption in the random oracle model. Their
second scheme can be proven secure without random oracles. Zhang [19] pointed
out that their scheme without pairing [18] is insecure and discussed the flaws in
their security proof. To overcome the flaws, an improved scheme was proposed
with formal security analysis in the random oracle model. Li et al. [20] proposed
a provably secure certificate-based proxy signature scheme, and showed their scheme
was secure in the random oracle model. Ming and Wang [21] proposed an efficient
CBS scheme. Wu et al. [22] introduced a new security model of certificate-based
signatures. The model was not only more elaborated when compared with the ex-
isting ones, but also defined several new types of adversaries in CBS. Then, they
investigated the relationship between certificate-based signatures and certificateless
signatures by proposing a generic construction of certificate-based signatures from
certificateless signatures. Li et al. [23] presented two new certificate-based signature
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schemes secure against key replacement attacks. Their first scheme was existentially
unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks under the computational Diffie-
Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. Compared with the certificate-
based signature scheme [15], their scheme enjoyed shorter signature length and less
operation cost. Their second scheme was the first construction of certificate-based
signature secure against key replacement attacks in the standard model. Recently,
Li et al. [24] presented a short certificate-based signature scheme, which requires
only one group element in the signature length and one pairing operation in signa-
ture generation and verification. Furthermore, they [25] presented a provably secure
certificate-based signature scheme without pairings. The proposed schemes have
strong applicability in situations with limited bandwidth and power-constrained de-
vices. In addition, they [26] proposed a new certificate-based signcryption scheme
with enhanced security features, which performs signature and encryption in a sin-
gle logical step. In order to solve the key exposure problem, Li et al. proposed
forward-secure CBS schemes [27, 28] and certificate-based key-insulated signature
schemes [29, 30].
Certificate-based cryptography is a new kind of public key cryptography, which
combines the merits of traditional public key infrastructure (PKI) and identity-based
cryptography. It does not have the inherent key escrow problem in the identity-based
cryptography, and eliminates the certificate revocation problem and third-party
queries in the traditional PKI [14]. Certificate-based cryptography could be used
to construct an efficient PKI [31] and have attracted a lot of attention since it was
proposed. To date, there is no concrete construction of certificate-based designated
verifier signature. This paper is aimed at constructing an efficient certificate-based
designated verifier signature scheme.
Our Motivation and Contribution. As discussed above, DVS was originally
introduced under traditional public key cryptosystem, where the public key of
the user is a random string. The central problem in traditional PKC is to
prove that a public key is genuine and authentic, and has not been tampered by
malicious users. The usual approach is to use a certificate to bind the identity
of an entity, its public key and other information. Certificates are generated
by CA, which can be viewed as CA’s signature. However, traditional PKC
is generally considered to be costly to use and manage. Although identity-
based DVS scheme overcomes the certificate revocation problem and third-party
queries in traditional PKC, it suffers from key escrow problem. In order to
solve the above problem, we introduce the notion of certificate-based designated
verifier signatures (CBDVS) and propose the first security model of CBDVS.
We then present the first construction of CBDVS. Our scheme is existentially
unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks in the random oracle model.
Organization of the Paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 gives some definitions that are required in the paper. We present defini-
tion and adversarial model of CBDVS in Section 3. In Section 4, we propose an
efficient CBDVS scheme. We provide the security proof in Section 5. In Sec-
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tion 6, we analyze the performances of the proposed CBDVS scheme. Finally,
we conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 PRELIMINARIES
This section reviews the notation of bilinear mapping and some complexity problems
that are required to understand the following sections.
Let G1 denote an additive group of order q and G2 be a multiplicative group
of the same order. Let P denote a generator of G1. e : G1 × G1 → G2 is called a
bilinear mapping if it satisfies the following properties:
• Bilinear: e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab for all P,Q ∈ G1, a, b ∈ Zq;
• Non-degeneracy: There exist P,Q ∈ G1 such that e(P,Q) 6= 1;
• Computable: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q) for all
P,Q ∈ G1.
Definition 1 (CDHP (Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem)). Given a random-
ly chosen P ∈ G1, as well as aP, bP ∈ G1 (for unknown randomly chosen a, b ∈ Z∗q),
compute abP .
Definition 2 (CBDHP (Computational Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem)). Given
a randomly chosen P ∈ G1, as well as aP, bP, cP ∈ G1 (for unknown randomly
chosen a, b, c ∈ Z∗q), compute e(P, P )abc ∈ G2.
Definition 3 (DBDHP (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem)). Given a ra-
ndomly chosen P ∈ G1, as well as aP, bP, cP ∈ G1 (for unknown randomly chosen
a, b, c ∈ Z∗q) and h ∈ G2, decide whether h = e(P, P )abc.
Definition 4 (GBDHP (Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem)). Given a random-
ly chosen P ∈ G1, as well as aP, bP, cP ∈ G1 (for unknown randomly chosen a, b, c ∈
Z∗q), compute e(P, P )abc ∈ G2 with the help of the DBDH oracle.
3 DEFINITION AND ADVERSARIAL MODEL OF CBDVS
3.1 Definition
There are three parties in a CBDVS scheme: signer IDA, designated verifier IDB,
and certificate authority (CA). A CBDVS scheme is defined by six algorithms:
Setup, UserKeyGen, CertGen, Sign, Verify, Transcript Simulation.
Setup: This algorithm takes the security parameter l as input and returns system
parameter param. CA selects the master secret key msk and computes the
master public key mpk. CA publishes param, mpk, but keeps msk secret.
UserKeyGen: This algorithm takes param, mpk as input and returns the user’s
key pair (SIDi , PIDi).
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CertGen: This algorithm takes param, mpk, the user’s identity IDi, the public
key PIDi of IDi and the master secret key msk as input, and returns the user’s
certificate certIDi .
Sign: This algorithm takes param, mpk, a message m, the certificate certIDA , the
private key SIDA of IDA and the public key PIDB of IDB as input, and returns
a signature σ.
Verify: This algorithm takes a message/signature pair (m,σ), SIDB , certIDB , PIDA
and param, mpk as input, and outputs d ∈ (acc, rej).
Transcript Simulation: This algorithm takes param,mpk,m, certIDB , SIDB and
PIDA as input, and returns a transcript σ.
3.2 Adversarial Model of CBDVS
There are two types of adversaries with different capabilities in CBDVS system:
Type I adversary: A type I adversary AI has the ability to replace the public key
of any entity with a value of his choice. However, he does not have access to
the master secret key and the certificates of the replaced public key. This type
of adversary also can deceive anyone into using the replaced public key to verify
signatures.
Type II adversary: Type II adversary AII simulates a malicious CA. This type
of adversary has access to the master secret key and can generate certificates,
but cannot perform public key replacement.
We use two games to describe the security of CBDVS as follows.
3.2.1 CBDVS Game 1
The security of CBDVS against a type I adversary AI is defined by the game de-
scribed below:
1. Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm to obtain the system parameter
param and master secret/public key pair (msk,mpk), publishes param and mpk.
2. UserCreate: The challenger runs the UserKeyGen algorithm to generate the
user’s public/private key (SIDi , PIDi), i ∈ {1, 2, . . .} for the user IDi, and returns
(SIDi , PIDi) to adversary AI .
3. PublicKey Replace: Adversary AI randomly chooses P ′IDi in the public key




4. CertGen Queries: When adversary AI makes a certificate generation query
(IDi, PIDi), the challenger runs the CertGen algorithm to generate a certificate
certIDi and returns certIDi to AI .
5. Sign Queries: When adversary AI makes a sign query (m, IDi, IDj, PIDi , PIDj),
the challenger runs the Sign algorithm to generate a signature σ, and returns σ
to AI .
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6. Verify Queries: When adversary AI makes a verify query (m, IDi, IDj, σ, PIDi ,
PIDj), the challenger runs the Verify algorithm to decide whether (m,σ, IDi,
IDj, PIDi , PIDj) is valid or not, and returns d ∈ (acc, rej) to AI .




We say AI wins the game if the forgery satisfies the following requirements:
(a) σ∗ is a valid signature on the message m∗ with the signer’s identity IDA, the
designated verifier’s identity IDB , and their public keys (P
∗
IDA
, P ∗IDB). Here,
P ∗IDA and P
∗
IDB
are chosen by AI and might not be those returned from the
oracle UserCreate.
(b) (m∗, IDA, IDB, P
∗
IDA
, P ∗IDB) has never been submitted as one of Sign queries.
(c) IDA and IDB have never been submitted as one of CertGen queries.
A CBDVS scheme is existentially unforgeable against a type I adversary if no
polynomial-time adversary can win the above game with a non-negligible proba-
bility.
3.2.2 CBDVS Game 2
The security of CBDVS against a type II adversary AII is defined by the game
described below:
1. Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm to obtain the system parameter
param and master secret/public key pair (msk,mpk), and sends param, msk and
mpk to AII .
2. UserCreate: The challenger runs the UserKeyGen algorithm to generate the
user’s public/private key (SIDi , PIDi), i ∈ {1, 2, . . .} for the user IDi, and returns
PIDi to adversary AII .
3. Corruption: When adversary AII makes a corruption query IDi, the challenger
responds with the private key SIDi .
4. Sign Queries: When adversary AII makes a sign query (m, IDi, IDj), the chal-
lenger runs the Sign algorithm to generate a signature σ, and returns σ to
adversary AII .
5. Verify Queries: When adversary AII makes a verify query (m, IDi, IDj, σ), the
challenger runs the Verify algorithm to decide whether (m, IDi, IDj, σ) is valid
or not, and returns d ∈ (acc, rej) to adversary AII .
6. Output: After all queries, adversary AII outputs a forgery (m∗, IDA, IDB, σ∗).
We say AII wins the game if the forgery satisfies the following requirements:
(a) σ∗ is a valid signature on the message m∗ with the signer’s identity IDA, the
designated verifier’s identity IDB and their public keys.
(b) (m∗, IDA, IDB) has never been submitted as one of Sign queries.
(c) IDA and IDB have never been submitted as one of Corruption queries.
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A CBDVS scheme is existentially unforgeable against a type II adversary if no
polynomial-time adversary can win the above game with a non-negligible probability.
4 OUR SCHEME
Setup: The CA executes the following steps:
Step 1: Takes the security parameter l as input and generates the system pa-
rameter (G1,G2, q, e, P ), where G1 and G2 are group of the same prime order
q and e : G1 ×G1 → G2 is a bilinear mapping.
Step 2: Randomly selects master secret key msk = s ∈ Z∗q and sets master
public key mpk = Ppub = sP .
Step 3: Chooses two cryptographic hash functions H0 : {0, 1}∗×G1 → G1 and
H1 : {0, 1}∗ ×G1 ×G2 → G1.
Step 4: Keeps the master key msk = s secret and publishes params = (G1,G2,
q, e, P,H0, H1, Ppub).
UserKeyGen: User IDi randomly selects his/her private key SIDi , and calculates
his/her public key PIDi = SIDiP . The user key pair is (SIDi , PIDi), i ∈ {A,B}.
CertGen: CA uses the system parameter and the master secret key msk to generate
the user’s certificate.
Step 1: The user IDi sends CA a data string data which contains the informa-
tion of user’s public key PIDi and identity IDi.
Step 2: CA verifies user’s information. If everything is correct, CA computes
QIDi = H0(IDi, PIDi) ∈ G1, certIDi = sQIDi , and sends certIDi to user
IDi,i ∈ {A,B}.
Sign: The signer IDA performs the following steps to sign a message m for the
designated verifier IDB.
K1 = SIDAPIDB ,
K2 = e(certIDA , QIDB),
σ = H1(m,K1, K2).
Verify: The designated verifier IDB performs the following steps to verify a signa-
ture σ on a message m from the signer IDA.
σ
?
= H1(m,SIDBPIDA , e(certIDB , QIDA))
If the above equation holds, IDB will accept σ as a valid signature. Otherwise,
σ is an invalid signature.
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Transcript Simulation: IDB can generate the signature σ
′ intended for him by
performing the following steps.
K ′1 = SIDBPIDA ,












K2 = e(certIDA , QIDB)
= e(sQIDA , QIDB)
= e(sQIDB , QIDA)
= e(certIDB , QIDA).
Therefore: σ = H1(m,K1, K2) = H1(m,SIDBPIDA , e(certIDB , QIDA)).
Similarly, signatures generated by Transcript Simulation algorithm will always
pass the Verify algorithm.
5 CBDVS SECURITY ANALYSIS
Theorem 1. If there is a type I adversary AI can forge a valid signature of the
proposed scheme with success probability ε after making qH0 queries to H0 oracle,
qH1 queries to H1 oracle, and qS signing queries, then there exists an algorithm B
who can use to solve an instance of the GBDH problem with probability at least
(1/qH0)
2(1− 1/(2l − qH1 − qS))ε. (l is the security parameter of CBDVS scheme.)
Proof. Given a random instance (P, P1 = aP, P2 = bP, P3 = cP ) of GBDH problem,
we will show how B can use AI to obtain the value of e(P, P )abc ∈ G2 with the help
of the DBDH oracle. We assume that AI is well-behaved in the sense that AI will
never repeat the same queries in the simulation.
Setup: In this game, B will set the system parameters. B starts by setting Ppub =
cP and returns {G1,G2, q, e, P, Ppub} to AI .
UserCreate: B maintains a list L-list which consists of the tuples (IDi, sIDi , PIDi ,
ai) described as follows. The list is initially empty. When AI queries the oracle
with a request IDi, B creates user IDi. B randomly chooses sIDi ∈ Z∗q, and
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computes PIDi = sIDiP . Then B adds (IDi, sIDi , PIDi , 0) into L-list, and returns
(sIDi , PIDi) to adversary AI .
PublicKey Replace: AI randomly selects P
′
IDi
∈ G1 to replace the public key of
the user IDi, B will search L-list,





2. Otherwise, B adds (IDi,⊥, P
′
IDi
, 1) into L-list.
H0 oracle: B maintains a list H0-list which consists of the tuples (IDi, PIDi , αIDi ,
QIDi) described as follows. The list is initially empty. B first chooses two integers
(u, v) from 1 to qH0 . When AI queries the H0 oracle with a request (IDi, PIDi),
1. If i = u, B randomly selects αIDi ∈ Z∗q and computes QIDi = αIDiaP . Then
B adds (IDi, PIDi , αIDi , QIDi) into H0-list and returns QIDi to AI as the
answer.
2. Else if i = v, B randomly selects αIDi ∈ Z∗q and computes QIDi = αIDibP .
Then B adds (IDi, PIDi , αIDi , QIDi) into H0-list and returns QIDi to AI as
the answer.
3. Otherwise, B randomly selects αIDi ∈ Z∗q and computes QIDi = αIDiP .
Then B adds (IDi, PIDi , αIDi , QIDi) into H0-list and returns QIDi to AI as
the answer.
CertGen Queries: AI requests the certificate of (IDi, PIDi), B search H0-list.
1. If i = u or i = v, B aborts the game and the simulation fails.
2. Else, B computes certIDi = αIDiPpub, and returns certIDi to adversary AI .
H1 oracle: Algorithm B maintains a list H1-list which consists of the tuples (mi,
K1i, K2i, IDm, IDn, σi, P
i
IDm
, P iIDn) explained as below (P
i
IDm
and P iIDn are the
public keys of IDm and IDn, respectively, in the i
th times sign query). The list
is initially empty. When AI makes a request (mi, K1i, K2i) to the H1 oracle,
B will search H1-list.
1. If there is an item (mj, K1j, K2j, ∗, ∗, σj, ∗, ∗) in H1-list such that mi = mj,
(K1i, K2i) 6= (K1j, K2j). Algorithm B randomly selects σi ∈ G1 such that
there is no item (∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, σi, ∗, ∗) in the H1-list. Then B adds (mi, K1i, K2i,
⊥,⊥, σi,⊥,⊥) into the H1-list, and returns σi to adversary AI .
2. If there is an item (mj,⊥,⊥, IDm, IDn, σj, P jIDm , P
j
IDn
) in H1-list such that









, Ppub, K2i) is a BDH tuple. Q
j
IDm
is determined by the signer
IDm’s public key P
j
IDm
. QjIDn is determined by the designated verifier IDn’s
public key P jIDn .
(a) If the above two conditions hold, B rewrites this form as (mi, K1i, K2i,
IDm, IDn, σj, P
j
IDm
, P jIDn), and returns σj to adversary AI .
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(b) Otherwise, B chooses a random σi ∈ G1 such that there is no item
(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, σi, ∗, ∗) in H1-list. Then B adds (mi, K1i, K2i,⊥,⊥, σi,⊥,⊥)
into H1-list and returns σi to adversary AI .
3. Otherwise, B chooses a random σi ∈ G1 such that there is no item (∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗,
σi, ∗, ∗) in H1-list. Then B adds (mi, K1i, K2i,⊥,⊥, σi,⊥,⊥) into H1-list and
returns σi to adversary AI .
Sign Oracle: In this game, B will simulate the sign algorithm. At any time AI
can query the sign algorithm. After receiving AI ’s request (mi, IDm, IDn, P iIDm ,
P iIDn), B checks the H1-list:
1. If there is an item (mj, K1j, K2j,⊥,⊥, σj,⊥,⊥) in H1-list such that mi = mj,





= e(P,K1j) and (Q
i
IDm
, QiIDn , Ppub, K2j)
is a BDH tuple. Suppose the above two conditions hold, B rewrites this form
as (mi, K1j, K2j, IDm, IDn, σj, P
i
IDm
, P iIDn) and returns σj to adversary AI .
2. If there is an item (mj, K1j, K2j, IDp, IDk, σj, P
j
IDp
, P jIDk) in H1-list such that
mi = mj but (IDp, IDk, P
j
IDp
, P jIDk) 6= (IDm, IDn, P
i
IDm
, P iIDn), B first tests





= e(P,K1j) and whether (Q
i
IDm
, QiIDn , Ppub, K2j) is
a BDH tuple. Suppose the above two conditions hold, B rewrites this form
as (mi, K1j, K2j, IDm, IDn, σj, P
i
IDm
, P iIDn) and returns σj to adversary AI .
3. If there is an item (mj,⊥,⊥, IDp, IDk, σj, P jIDp , P
j
IDk
) in H1-list such that
mi = mj, but (IDp, IDk, P
j
IDp
, P jIDk) 6= (IDm, IDn, P
i
IDm
, P iIDn), B first





= e(P jIDp , P
j
IDk









). Suppose the above two conditions hold, B adds (mi,⊥,⊥,
IDm, IDn, σj, P
i
IDm
, P iIDn) into H1-list and returns σj to adversary AI .
4. Otherwise, B chooses a random σi ∈ G1 such that there is no item (∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗,




H1-list and returns σi to adversary AI .
Verify Oracle: In this game, B will simulate the verify algorithm. At any time AI
can query the verify algorithm. After receiving AI ’s request (mi, IDm, IDn, σi,
P iIDm , P
i
IDn
), B checks the H1-list:
1. If there is an item (mi, ∗, ∗, IDm, IDn, σi, P iIDm , P
i
IDn
) inH1-list, B will accept
it as a valid signature.
2. If there is an item (mj, K1j, K2j, IDp, IDk, σj, P
j
IDp
, P jIDk) in H1-list such that
mi = mj, σi = σj and (IDp, IDk, P
j
IDp









= e(P,K1j) and (Q
i
IDm
, QiIDn , Ppub, K2j) is




, P iIDn) into H1-list and accepts it as a valid signature.
3. If there is an item (mj, K1j, K2j,⊥,⊥, σj,⊥,⊥) in H1-list such that mi =





= e(P,K1j) and whether




, Ppub, K2j) is a BDH tuple. If the above two conditions hold,




it as a valid signature.
4. If there is an item (mj,⊥,⊥, IDp, IDk, σj, P jIDp , P
j
IDk
) in H1-list such that
mi = mj, σi = σj and (IDp, IDk, P
j
IDp









= e(P jIDp , P
j
IDk









) hold. If the above two conditions hold, B adds (mi,⊥,⊥,
IDm, IDn, σj, P
i
IDm
, P iIDn) into H1-list and accepts it as a valid signature.





(a) If σi = σ
′
i, B accepts it as a valid signature.
(b) Otherwise, B rejects it as an invalid signature.
Output: AI outputs a valid designated verifier signature (m∗, IDA, IDB, σ∗, P ∗IDA ,
P ∗IDB) which satisfies the following requirements:
1. (m∗, IDA, IDB, P
∗
IDA
, P ∗IDB) has never been submitted as one of Sign queries.
2. IDA and IDB have never been submitted as one of CertGen queries.
Since (m∗, IDA, IDB, σ
∗, P ∗IDA , P
∗
IDB
) is a valid message/signature pair, which
means there is an item (m∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, σ∗, ∗, ∗) in H1-list with probability 1 −
1/(2l − qH1 − qS). By the definition of adversary model, (m∗, IDA, IDB, P ∗IDA ,
P ∗IDB) cannot be queried to the sign oracle, so σ
∗ is returned as the hash value
of AI ’ query. That is to say, there is an item (m∗, K∗1 , K∗2 , ∗, ∗, σ∗, ∗, ∗) in the











If {IDA, IDB} = {IDu, IDv} then e(Q∗IDA , cert
∗
IDB
) = e(P, P )
abcα∗IDA
α∗IDB =











. This occurs with probability at least (1/qH0)
2, where qH0 is the
number of queries sent to the H0 oracle.
Therefore, B can solve the given instance of the GBDH problem with probability
at least (1/qH0)
2(1− 1/(2l − qH1 − qS))ε.

Theorem 2. If there is a type II adversary AII can forge a valid signature of the
proposed scheme with success probability ε after making qUC user creation queries,
qH1 queries to H1 oracle and qS signing queries, then there exists an algorithm B
who can use AII to solve an instance of the CDH problem with probability at
least ε′ = (1/qUC)
2(1− 1/(2l − qH1 − qS))ε. (l is the security parameter of CBDVS
scheme).
Proof. Given a random instance (P, P1 = aP, P2 = bP ) of CDH problem, we will
show how B can use AII to obtain the value of abP ∈ G1. We assume that AII will
never repeat the same queries in the simulation.
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Setup: In this game, B will set the system parameters. B randomly chooses s ∈ Z∗q
and computes Ppub = sP . B returns {G1,G2, q, e, s, P, Ppub} to adversary AII .
UserCreate: B maintains a list L-list which consists of the tuples (IDi, sIDi , PIDi ,
ai) described as follows. The list is initially empty. B first chooses two integers
(u, v) from 1 to qUC . When AII queries the oracle with a request IDi:
1. If i = u, B adds (IDi,⊥, P1) into L-list, and returns P1 to AII .
2. If i = v, B adds (IDi,⊥, P2) into L-list, and returns P2 to AII .
3. Otherwise, B randomly chooses sIDi ∈ Z∗q and computes PIDi = sIDiP . Then
B adds (IDi, sIDi , PIDi) into L-list, and returns PIDi to adversary AII .
Corruption: When adversary AII makes a corruption query of a created user IDi:
1. If i = u or i = v, B aborts the game and the simulation fails.
2. Otherwise, B returns the private key sIDi to the adversary AII .
H0 oracle: At any time AII can query the random oracle H0. B maintains a list
H0-list which consists of the tuples (IDi, QIDi) described as follows. The list is
initially empty. When AII queries the oracle H0 with the request IDi, B ran-
domly chooses QIDi ∈ G1, adds (IDi, QIDi) into L-list, and returns QIDi to
adversary AII .
H1 oracle: At any timeAII can query the random oracle H1. B maintains a list H1-
list which consists of the tuples (mi, K1i, K2i, IDm, IDn, σi) described as follows.
The list is initially empty. WhenAII makes a request (mi, K1i, K2i) to the oracle
H1, B will search H1-list.
1. If there is an item (mi, K1j, K2j,⊥,⊥, σj) in H1-list such that (K1i, K2i) 6=
(K1j, K2j), B randomly chooses σi ∈ G1 such that there is no item (∗, ∗, ∗, ∗,
∗, σi) in H1-list. Then B adds (mi, K1i, K2i,⊥,⊥, σj) into H1-list, and returns
σi to adversary AII .
2. If there is an item (mj,⊥,⊥, IDm, IDn, σj) in H1-list such that mi = mj, B
verifies whether e(PIDm , PIDn)
?
= e(P,K1i) and K2i
?
= e(QIDm , QIDn).
(a) If the above two conditions hold, B rewrites this form as (mi, K1i, K2i,
IDm, IDn, σi) and returns σi to adversary AII .
(b) Otherwise, B randomly chooses σi ∈ G1 such that there is no item
(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, σi) in H1-list. Then B adds (mi, K1i, K2i,⊥,⊥, σi) into H1-
list and returns σi to adversary AII .
3. If there is an item (mj, K1j, K2j, IDm, IDn, σj) in H1-list such that (mj, K1j,
K2j) = (mi, K1i, K2i), B returns σj to adversary AII .
4. Otherwise, B randomly chooses σi ∈ G1 such that there is no item (∗, ∗, ∗, ∗,
∗, σi) in the H1-list, adds (mi, K1i, K2i,⊥,⊥, σi) into H1-list and returns σi
to AII .
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Sign Oracle: In this game, B will simulate the sign algorithm. At any time AII
can query the sign algorithm. For a signing request (mi, IDm, IDn):
1. If IDm /∈ {IDu, IDv}, B computes K1i = SIDmPIDn and K2i = e(certIDm ,
QIDn). Then, B checks the H1-list.
(a) If there is an item (mi, K1i, K2i,⊥,⊥, σi) in H1-list, B rewrites this form
as (mi, K1i, K2i, IDm, IDn, σi) and returns σi to adversary AII .
(b) If there is an item (mi, K1i, K2i, IDp, IDk, σi) in H1-list such that (IDp,
IDk) 6= (IDm, IDn), B adds (mi, K1i, K2i, IDm, IDn, σi) into H1-list and
returns σi to adversary AII .
(c) Otherwise, B randomly chooses σi ∈ G1 such that there is no item
(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, σi) in H1-list. Then B adds (mi, K1i, K2i, IDm, IDn, σi) into
H1-list and returns σi to adversary AII .
2. If IDn /∈ {IDu, IDv}, B computes K1i = sIDmPIDn , K2i = e(certIDm , QIDn)
and checks H1-list.
(a) If there is an item (mi, K1i, K2i,⊥,⊥, σi) in H1-list, B rewrites this form
as (mi, K1i, K2i, IDm, IDn, σi) and returns σi to adversary AII .
(b) If there is an item (mi, K1i, K2i, IDp, IDk, σi) in H1-list such that (IDp,
IDk) 6= (IDm, IDn), B adds (mi, K1i, K2i, IDm, IDn, σi) into H1-list and
returns σi to adversary AII .
(c) Other, B randomly chooses σi ∈ G1 such that there is no item (∗, ∗, ∗, ∗,
∗, σi) in H1-list. Then B adds (mi, K1i, K2i, IDm, IDn, σi) into H1-list
and returns σi to adversary AII .
3. Otherwise,(IDm, IDn) = (IDu, IDv), B checks H1-list.
(a) If there is an item (mj, K1j, K2j,⊥,⊥, σj) in H1-list such that mi = mj,
B verifies whether e(PIDm , PIDn)
?
= e(P,K1j) and K2j
?
= e(sQIDm , QIDn).
i If the above two conditions hold, B rewrites this form as (mi, K1j, K2j,
IDm, IDn, σj) and returns σj to adversary AII .
ii Otherwise, B randomly chooses σi ∈ G1 such that there is no item
(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, σj) in H1-list. Then B adds (mi,⊥,⊥, IDm, IDn, σi) into
H1-list and returns σi to adversary AII .
(b) If there is an item (mj, K1j, K2j, IDp, IDk, σj) in H1-list such that mi =





= e(sQIDm , QIDn).
i If the above two conditions hold, B adds (mi, K1j, K2j, IDm, IDn, σj)
into H1-list and returns σj to adversary AII .
ii Otherwise, B randomly chooses σi ∈ G1 such that there is no item
(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, σi) in H1-list. Then B adds (mi,⊥,⊥, IDm, IDn, σi) into
H1-list and returns σi to adversary AII .
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(c) Otherwise, B randomly chooses σi ∈ G1 such that there is no item
(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, σi) in H1-list. Then B adds (mi,⊥,⊥, IDm, IDn, σi) into H1-
list and returns σi to adversary AII .
Verify Oracle: In this game, B will simulate the verify algorithm. At any time AII
can query the verify algorithm. After receivingAII ’s request (mi, IDm, IDn, σi),
B checks the H1-list:
1. If there is an item (mi, K1i, K2i, IDm, IDn, σi) or (mi,⊥,⊥, IDm, IDn, σi) in
H1-list, B will accept it as a valid signature.
2. Else, if there is an item (mi, K1i, K2i,⊥,⊥, σi) in H1-list, B verifies whether
e(PIDm , PIDn)
?
= e(P,K1i) and K2i
?
= e(sQIDm , QIDn). If the above two con-
ditions hold, B rewrites this form as (mi, K1i, K2i, IDm, IDn, σi) and accepts
it as a valid signature.
3. Else, there is an item (mj, K1j, K2j, IDp, IDk, σj) in H1-list such that mi =
mj, σi = σj and (IDp, IDk) 6= (IDm, IDn), B verifies whether e(PIDm ,
PIDn)
?
= e(P,K1j) and K2j
?
= e(sQIDm , QIDn). If the above two condi-
tions hold, B adds (mi, K1j, K2j, IDm, IDn, σi) into H1-list and accepts it as
a valid signature.
4. Otherwise, B queries the sign algorithm with (mi, IDm, IDn), and obtains
the signature σ′i.
(a) If σi = σ
′
i, B will accept it as a valid signature.
(b) Otherwise, B rejects it as an invalid signature.
Output: AII outputs a valid designated verifier signature (m∗, IDA, IDB, σ∗)
which satisfies the following requirements:
1. (m∗, IDA, IDB) has never been submitted as one of Sign queries.
2. IDA and IDB have never been submitted as one of Corruption queries.
Since (m∗, IDA, IDB, σ
∗) is a valid message/signature pair, which means there
is an item (m∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, σ∗) in H1-list with probability 1 − 1/(2l − qH1 − qS).
By the definition of adversary model, (m∗, IDA, IDB) cannot be queried to the
sign oracle, so σ∗ is returned as the hash value of AII ’s query. That is to say,
there is an item (m∗, K∗1 , K
∗
2 , ∗, ∗, σ∗) in the H1-list such that K∗1 = sIDAPIDB =
sIDAsIDBP and K
∗
2 = e(sQIDA , QIDB). If {IDA, IDB} = {IDu, IDv}, then
K∗1 = abP . This occurs with probability at least (1/qUC)
2, where qUC is the
number of queries sent to the user creation oracle.
The probability that B does not fail during the simulation is (1−1/(2l−qH1−qS)).
Therefore, B can solve the given instance of CDH problem with probability at
least (1/qUC)
2(1− 1/(2l − qH1 − qS))ε.

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6 EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
We use the following table to show the computation cost and communication band-
width of our scheme. The following notations will be used in Table 1: |G1|: bit
length of elements in G1; |G2|: bit length of elements in G2; BP : bilinear mapping
operation; M : scalar multiplication in G1; E: exponentiation in G1.
Sign Verify Sign length
Our scheme 1BP + 1M 1BP + 1M |G1|
Table 1. Efficiency analysis
The above analysis shows that our scheme only needs two pairing operations
and the signature is only one element in the bilinear group G1 (about 171 bit, please
refer to [32] in detail). Thus our scheme enjoys less operation cost and shortest
signature length.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced the notion of certificate-based designated verifier signa-
tures (CBDVS). The security of CBDVS against two types of adversaries is formally
defined. Furthermore, we proposed an efficient CBDVS scheme. We show that the
scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks in the
random oracle model. Efficiency analysis shows that the proposed scheme has low
computation cost and low communication bandwidth, which makes our scheme pos-
sess strong applicability in situations with limited bandwidth and power-constrained
devices, for example, RFID devices [33], attribute-based signature [34] and cloud
computing [35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43].
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